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BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITU-
TION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE 
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA. By Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr.' Yale University Press. 2000. Pp. 417. $40.00. 
Tony A. Freyer 
The federal judiciary's role in American constitutional gov-
ernance is a useful reference point at the new millennium. Early 
in the nation's life Alexis de Tocqueville commented that the in-
terdependency between unelected federal judges and an aggres-
sively active democracy reflected the distinctiveness of Ameri-
can institutions.3 During the twentieth century, the impact of the 
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary on American society 
and government seemed to grow apace. Following the Second 
World War, the historic promotion of civil rights and liberties 
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren and the Su-
preme Court highlighted the irony that attaining greater democ-
ratic inclusiveness depended on a nonelected judiciary. Since 
the 1970s growing numbers of commentators questioned the 
propriety of this constitutional interdependency, while others de-
1. Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor, New York Law School. 
2. University Research Professor of History and Law, The University of Alabama. 
A.B., San Diego State University, 1970; A.M. 1972, PhD, 1975, Indiana University. The 
author accepted the invitation to review this book on the understanding that he would 
acknowledge that he contributed a statement the publisher used for promotional pur-
poses. Also the author wishes to thank for support, Dean Kenneth C. Randall, The Uni-
versity of Alabama Law School Foundation, and the Edward Brett Randolph Fund. 
3. De Tocqueville's assessment may be summarized as follows: In antebellum 
America the states rather than the federal government exercised "real power." Never-
theless, Americans accepted that "it was almost impossible that the execution of a new 
law should not injure some private interest." The Constitution's "makers ... relied on 
that private interest to attack the legislative measure of which the Union might have 
complained[,)" and "[i)t is to that interest that they offer protection." Thus, while federal 
justice and state sovereignty were at odds, the federal judiciary "attacks only indi-
rectly ... strik[ing) at the consequences of the law, not at its principle; it does not abolish 
but enervates it." The federal courts "intervene[ d) in public affairs only by chance, but 
that chance recur[ red] daily." Thus "Federal judges almost always alone decide those 
questions that touch the government of the country most closely." Alexis de Toc-
queville, Democracy in America 99, 143, 148, 149, 276 n.7. (J.P. Mayer, ed., George Law-
rence trans., Doubleday, 1969). 
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fended it as an appropriate expression of institutional checks and 
balances.4 
Through the changing image of the prominent Progressive 
figure, Louis D. Brandeis and his landmark opinion in Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins (1938), Edward A. Purcell's new book locates 
this institutional transformation within the sweep of twentieth-
century American social and political conflict. Lawyers recall 
Erie as a "great case" and "jurisprudential landmark" which 
nonetheless remains controversial because it establishes a consti-
tutionally contentious procedural boundary between state and 
federal court jurisdiction. Most historians, by contrast, find the 
decision of interest because it is associated with legalistic ma-
neuvering which has been especially favorable to corporate liti-
gants, including the practice known as forum shopping by which 
corporate defendants escaped less friendly state courts by re-
moving cases to federal courts.5 
An historian who wrote a prize-winning study of democratic 
theory in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, 
Purcell has been for some years a practicing lawyer and law pro-
fessor. Thus, in the language of history and law Purcell is flu-
ently bilingual. He has drawn together the two disciplines in a 
growing body of scholarship, including a thoughtful and exten-
sive social and legal history of federal diversity jurisdiction in in-
dustrial America, 1870-1958.6 His new book gives historians a 
deeper understanding of the federal judiciary-and the legal 
profession, which are its chief agents-as central institutional 
channels for ordering social conflict within American constitu-
tional governance and the corporate market economy. It pro-
vides members of the legal profession insight into the procedural 
and constitutional issues associated with the origins, decision, 
and subsequent evolution of one of the most important prece-
dents in American law. 
Section I of this review considers the origins of what Purcell 
calls the Progressive constitution. The second section examines 
4. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and The Court: Judicial Review in a De-
mocracy (Macmillan, 1960); Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural Injunction, 7 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 335 (1984). 
5. See Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Purcell engages the huge 
literature about the Erie case, so that law teachers, practicing lawyers, and judges will 
find the book illuminating; fundamentally, though, it is a study of history, and as such, 
deserves to be widely read by historians. 
6. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion in Industrial America, I870-1958 (Oxford U. Press, 1992). 
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Brandeis's Erie opinion as part of the general transition from a 
Progressive to a liberal regulatory state. The third section sug-
gests how the splintered Court deciding Erie was indicative of 
tensions and unintended consequences influencing the course of 
judicial activism throughout the rest of the twentieth century. 
The fourth section raises two questions followed by a conclusion. 
I 
The Progressive constitution emerged from a reaction 
against the constitutional order that preceded it. The period fol-
lowing the Civil War and Reconstruction to World War I, one of 
the most economically and socially significant in U.S. history, re-
ceives very little attention from constitutional law scholars. 
Even so, American social and political struggle centered on the 
response to industrialization, particularly increasing social-class 
conflict associated with the growth of wage labor, greater de-
pendence on big business-what business historian Alfred 
Chandler called managerial capitalism-and the gradual devel-
opment of state and federal governmental institutions to match 
the scale of exploitive corporate power.7 The established view of 
the turn-of-the-century constitutional order undergoing this 
same transformation focuses on the Supreme Court's deploy-
ment of constitutional doctrines derived primarily from the due 
process and commerce clauses to emasculate labor and govern-
ment in favor of corporate capitalism. Protest movements, espe-
cially the Populists and the Progressives, fought back. But not 
until the Great Depression did Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal 
liberalism finally institute a constitutional regime in which gov-
ernment became as big as business. 
Purcell refines this accepted version of pro-capitalist consti-
tutionalism, arguing that a fundamental issue underlying private 
versus public ordering concerned the "primacy" of legislative or 
judicial authority. Opponents of big business envisioned a con-
stitutional order in which popular politics channeled through 
democratically elected state and federal legislatures predomi-
nated; contrariwise, business interests represented by elite law-
7. See Thomas K. McCraw, Government, Big Business and the Wealth of Nations, 
522-45; Jeffrey R. Fear, Constructing Big Business: The Cultural Concept of the Firm, 546-
74, in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Franco Amatori, Takashi Kikino, eds., Big Business and 
the Wealth of Nations (Cambridge U. Press, 1997). A notable exception to constitutional 
law scholars' lack of interest in the period is David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgot-
ten Years (Cambridge U. Press, 1998). 
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yers asserted that unelected federal judges with appointments 
based on good behavior should exercise dominant control. Pur-
cell's reformulation suggests that due process and commerce 
clause jurisprudence-which always involved exceptional cases 
in which the legislature was more often than not upheld- had 
less immediate impact on the daily lives of individual Americans 
than the exercise of the federal court's ordinary jurisdictional 
power.8 
Purcell's focus on federal court jurisdiction begins with a 
doctrine the Supreme Court established in Swift v. Tyson 
(1842).9 That case raised the narrow issue of the interpretation 
of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that ex-
cept for matters involving federal law and the Constitution itself, 
federal courts were bound by state law in all cases where it ap-
plied. The case arose from a series of speculative investments 
transacted through the medium of commercial credit contracts, 
which unraveled during the depression of 1839-43. The question 
before the Court was what source of law to apply in relation to 
section 34: did the law of New York or Maine, the residences of 
the debtor and creditor, respectively, control, or did federal 
judges possess a discretionary power to look beyond the state's 
8. The Progressives, of course, distrusted federal courts, but recognized that the 
American constitutional tradition sanctioned a legitimate exercise of judicial review, par-
ticularly as umpire of federal-state relations. Despite their criticism of the freedom of 
contract doctrine associated with economic due process, for example, they recognized 
that the Supreme Court often upheld diverse state regulations of private contracts. The 
objective fact that the Lochner era had a low rate of invalidation has been noted by his-
torians and lawyers for some time. See Tony Allan Freyer, Forums of Order: The Fed-
eral Courts and Business in American History 99-141 (JAI Press, 1979); Melvin I. Urof-
sky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive 
Era, in Yearbook 1983: Supreme Court Historical Society; Charles Warren, A Bulwark to 
the State Police Power: The United States Supreme Court, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 667 (1913). 
Thus the Harvard Law Review's summary of development to 1914 stated: "The law ... 
seems everywhere to be that the legislature may, to some extent, at least, restrict liberty 
to contract in the supposed interest of the persons restrained." Indeed, complete free-
dom of contract was inconsistent with the necessity in a highly organized community for 
legislation to safeguard the public health, morals, safety, and general welfare. Extent of 
the Legislative Power to Limit Freedom of Contract, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 374 (1914). 
9. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 1 (1842). Purcell actually begins his discus-
sion not with the "original" Swift doctrine, but with the point to which it had evolved by 
the closing decades of the nineteenth century (see Progressive Constitution, 51-56). In 
the text I summarize the "original" Swift doctrine; below I suggest the utility of empha-
sizing this distinction. See Tony Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance: The Swift & Erie Cases 
in American Federalism 1-100 (New York U. Press, 1981); Tony A. Freyer, Business Law 
and Economic History in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., 2 The Cam-
bridge Economic History of the United States: The Long Nineteenth Century 456,461,465, 
470,472 (Cambridge U. Press, 2000). 
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local law to a body of internationally recognized commercial ju-
risprudence based on the practices of mercantile custom? 
Although lower federal court and Supreme Court cases had 
raised these issues indirectly, Swift was the first to present 
squarely the construction of section 34. In a unanimous decision 
written by Justice Joseph Story, the Court interpreted the sec-
tion to mean that the obligation to follow local law where it "ap-
plied" implied that there existed other sources of law-
particularly international commercial custom- that federal 
judges could draw upon for rules of decision to determine the 
rights and obligations of commercial litigants who, because they 
resided in different states or foreign nations, were qualified to 
enter federal court on the basis of the diversity of citizenship ju-
risdiction the Constitution and the Judiciary Act sanctioned. At 
the time, the decision was a non-controversial extension of di-
versity jurisdiction that Whigs such as Story, Democrats such as 
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, and even the rigidly states rights 
Virginia Democrat Peter V. Daniel agreed was a legitimate use 
of federal judicial discretion. Thus the decision did not interfere 
with state power, since it pertained only to parties who qualified 
for federal diversity jurisdiction. Rather, the jurisdictional the-
ory underlying Swift was consistent with the principle of dual 
sovereignty the Taney Court was developing in response to 
mounting popular discontent over American slavery and free-
dom. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the 
federal judiciary greatly extended the discretionary authority 
identified with the Swift doctrine. This expansion occurred, 
however, primarily after the Civil War and its accompanying in-
dustrialization transformed the United States into a global eco-
nomic player. What had been an abstract question of choice of 
law suddenly assumed real significance in a radically revamped 
economy. Thus, from the Civil War on, federal judges progres-
sively enlarged the doctrine to enable corporations doing inter-
state business to employ federal diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion to circumvent unfriendly state courts and juries. 10 In 
addition, the Supreme Court built up around the Swift doctrine 
constitutional protections of property and contract rights tran-
scending the limits of congressional legislation. In 1875 Con-
gress for the first time granted federal courts the full authority to 
10. Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 45-122 (cited in note 9); Purcell, Litigation 
and Inequality at 28-176 (cited in note 6). 
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assert claims under federal law-federal question jurisdiction-
as well as the Constitution itself. 
Disagreement among lower federal courts and a shifting 
majority on the Supreme Court nonetheless persisted concerning 
the relationship between the Swift doctrine, the expanded fed-
eral question jurisdiction, and their application to insurance, per-
sonal injury, and municipal bond debt litigation. In about 300 
bond cases the Court applied the transformed Swift doctrine in 
favor of foreign creditors.'' The insurance and personal injury 
litigation presented a more complicated picture: corporate de-
fendants initially used the threat of removing suits from state to 
federal court to force smaller settlements upon plaintiffs. By the 
1890s, however, plaintiffs' lawyers won decisions from the Su-
preme Court that were more favorable, instituting a dual market 
for legal services in which defense attorneys in the pay of corpo-
rations confronted plaintiffs' lawyers relying on contingent 
fees. 12 Although the picture remained ambiguous, the plaintiffs' 
lawyers, overall, won more often than they lost; but because the 
corporations possessed superior means to assert federal jurisdic-
tion, critics condemned the Swift doctrine as a tool of unfair cor-
porate manipulation. The escalating assault on what the Swift 
doctrine became after the Civil War stood in marked contrast to 
the Court's original, uncontroversial pre-war decision. Clearly, 
the social and political context had radically changed over time 
and with it the doctrine's meaning to contemporaries. 
Within this transformed wider context Purcell traces the 
struggles over federal jurisdiction and Progressive constitutional-
ism. Two issues were particularly contentious: the labor injunc-
tion and the inequitable litigation advantages that corporations 
had won over the years associated with the federal judiciary's 
administration of the Swift doctrine. The leading defender of 
outcomes favoring nationally operating corporate business was 
Justice David J. Brewer, who served on the Supreme Court from 
1890 to 1910. Purcell presents Brewer as a complex figure whose 
religious faith supported decisions benefiting women, African-
Americans, and Chinese immigrants; even so, this same religious 
conviction made Brewer an effective and zealous advocate of 
constitutional ideals granting extensive protections to corporate 
11. See Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88: Part 1, 918-1116 (6 
History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Paul A. Freund, Macmillan, 1971); 
see also Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner- Diversity, Jurisdiction and the Development 
of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1263 (2000). 
12. Purcell, Litigation and Inequality at 148-216 (cited in note 6). 
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property rights. Purcell's careful argument demonstrates that 
Brewer was the Court's chief architect of establishing judicial 
over legislative primacy, not only in his better known expansion 
of the labor injunction in Debs and other cases, but just as im-
portantly in broadening the reach of the Swift doctrine's federal 
common law to the benefit of corporate interests. 13 
Committed to overturning Brewer's constitutional edifice 
was the Progressive champion, Louis D. Brandeis. He went 
from decades of winning reforms as the "People's Lawyer," to a 
distinguished career as an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court between 1916 and 1939. As public advocate, Justice 
Brandeis epitomized the Progressive vision of American consti-
tutionalism which trusted experts use of facts to justify giving 
primary lawmaking authority to the legislature's democratic 
processes, particularly in order to redress economic abuses and 
social injustice. Brandeis possessed a distinctive personal faith in 
local control and the virtues of small-scale social, market, and 
governmental units against the "curse" of bigness. Yet he was 
also a brilliant and effective promoter of mainstream Progressive 
reform, including ending the abuses identified with the Swift 
doctrine and federal diversity jurisdiction. 14 
Purcell's focus on judicial versus legislative predominance 
revises the prevailing view of social conflict and judicial author-
ity during this period. Much contemporary American historiog-
raphy presents the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court as 
the promoter of big business in a one-sided clash with dispos-
sessed groups, epitomized by the union's fight against the labor 
injunction. Critical legal histories of the nation's labor struggles 
13. Sec In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Purcell's analysis of Justice David J. 
Brewer's role in expanding Swift is incomplete, especially concerning the protracted con-
frontation with Justice Stephan Field over the latter's effort to limit the Swift doctrine in 
accident cases by following the liberal English rule where an agent's negligence resulted 
in an injury to a fellow servant. Field succeeded in holding a 5-4 majority in Chicago, 
Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377 (1884), extending employer liability 
to include injuries to fellow servants caused by the negligence of train conductors. Pur-
cell notes that Brewer prevailed over Field in B & 0 R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893), 
but neglect of the long-term split underestimates how contested was growth of the fed-
eral common law among members of the Supreme Court over the post-Civil War dec-
ades. This helps to explain why in Erie the federal trial court and the federal circuit court 
of appeals would apply Baugh to uphold the damages awarded the injured party (see be-
low). Freyer, Harmony and Dissonance at 65-74, 125-29 (cited in note 9). 
14. Although Purcell cites the extensive literature about Brandeis, the distinctive-
ness of his values deserves greater emphasis. See Thomas K. McCraw's historical recov-
ery of a producerism rooted in petit bourgeois values; Prophets of Regulation: Charles 
Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, lames M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Belknap Press, 
1984). 
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have done much to revise the standard vision, including, most 
recently, Ruth O'Brien's study of the tension between the 
American Federation of Labor and the Progressives as they 
sought to maneuver around judges to attain a "subtle reform of 
labor law that fell somewhere between repudiation of the labor 
injunction and immunity for organized labor" that substituted 
"one form of legal restraint-the injunction-for another-the 
enforceability of collective bargaining agreements." 15 
Similarly, Purcell does not present the federal judiciary as a 
static agent -;imply serving the interests of business. It was a 
richly textured institution interacting on different levels with so-
ciety and politics to order private and public action. Even so, 
persistent confrontations over diversity jurisdiction and the Swift 
doctrine engendered a division among Progressives, with some 
arguing that winners and losers were not unequivocally clear, 
since often plaintiff's lawyers turned the system to the advantage 
of their clients. In addition, the constitutional limitations the ju-
diciary imposed upon state and federal administrative agencies 
constituted an uneven, often contradictory mix of lax and restric-
tive policies, as well as opportunities for countervailing interest-
group pressure and federal litigation. As a result, federal juris-
diction and constitutional decision making were part of a multi-
plicity of judicial, bureaucratic, and legislative channels by which 
interest groups articulated demands. The contingency of out-
comes sustained, in turn, a Progressive faith that striking a new 
balance between judicial and legislative authority was not only 
possible but also essential to the welfare of American society 
and government. 
II 
The clash between opposing visions of judicial and legisla-
tive primacy in American democracy shaped the Erie decision. 
During the mid-1930s Americans experienced the dramatic re-
versal of the Supreme Court's protracted resistance to Roose-
velt's New Deal; indeed, by the time the United States entered 
World War II, the Court had demolished the pro-corporate due 
process and commerce clause doctrines and instituted a constitu-
tional revolution sanctioning the liberal regulatory state. Purcell 
expands upon this well-known story, analyzing Brandeis's opin-
15. Ruth O'Brien, Workers' Paradox: The Republican Origins of New Deal Labor 
Policy, 1886-1935 at 42 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
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ion for the Court in Erie. 16 The incisive, multidimensional exe-
gesis of the opinion comprises about one third of the book. He 
locates the suit arising from the railroad's negligence to the un-
employed laborer Harry Tompkins, within the broad context of 
Depression-era congressional confrontations over diversity ju-
risdiction and the labor injunction in which the Progressives lost 
on the former issue but won the latter. 
Against this background of conflict, Purcell reveals the 
Court's inner process of decision-making, which resulted in over-
turning the ninety-six year old Swift doctrine. Brandeis's opin-
ion for a splintered Court transformed American federalism. 
After nearly a century it ended the discretionary authority fed-
eral judges had exercised to circumvent or ignore the state 
courts: from 1938 on federal judges were bound by state law, 
unless a federal statute or constitutional provision was at issue. 
Moreover, the decision's opaque language conveyed a new con-
stitutional obligation circumscribing federal judicial authority 
within the coextensive powers of Congress. Fundamentally, Erie 
replaced Brewer's constitutional principle of judicial primacy 
with a regime in which judicial and legislative powers were 
brought into closer alignment. 
Purcell makes Brandeis and the Erie opinion central to the 
ambiguous triumph of New Deal liberalism. The immediate 
beneficiaries were poorer and middle-class litigants represented 
by plaintiff trial lawyers, a side of the bar which, since the late-
nineteenth century, had steadily grown to rival in strength the 
corporate defense attorneys. Reform-minded Populists and 
Progressives fought to address the unfair advantages federal di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction gave corporate defendants op-
erating across state lines. Purcell ties this struggle into the Pro-
gressives' better-known campaign against the laissez-faire due 
process jurisprudence identified with the Supreme Court's noto-
rious decision of Lochner v. New York (1905). By linking the 
two reform objectives he demonstrates that Progressive constitu-
tionalism represented a powerful alternative to Justice Brewer's 
pro-corporate decisions. 
A preoccupation with Lochner obscures, moreover, the 
long-term effectiveness of the Progressive effort. In Muller v. 
16. Barry Cushman's revisionist interpretation of the origins of the New Deal 
Court, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (Ox-
ford U. Press, 1998), does not discuss Erie; Purcell, however, does draw upon Cushman's 
work to contextualize the decision within as well as without the Court. 
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Oregon (1908), for example, Brewer wrote an opinion for a 
unanimous Court upholding Brandeis's argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty did not prevent the 
state from enacting legislation aimed at improving the working 
conditions of women. More generally, elite professional legal 
groups broadly associated with Progressivism pushed for and of-
ten won increased rationalization of judicial and regulatory insti-
tutions-including federal court jurisdiction-until their efforts 
finally prevailed in the New Deal. Like Ellis Hawley and Alan 
Brinkley, Purcell is fully aware of the limitations involved in the 
transition from Progressive to liberal reform, es~ecially those re-
garding racial justice and wealth redistribution. 7 Erie nonethe-
less ended one source of corporate privilege resulting from the 
operation of federal court jurisdiction, just as the Court went 
from opposing to supporting New Deal liberalism as a whole. 
Thus, in conjunction with the collapse of the constitutional doc-
trines which marked the demise of Brewer's old order, Erie-as 
symbol and practice-embodied the triumph of Brandeis and the 
Progressive Constitution. 
Throughout the remainder of the twentieth century the 
practical and symbolic impact of Erie and its author changed. 
Purcell's contextualization of legal doctrine illuminates the shift 
from a Progressive to a liberal idea of the regulatory state, which 
ultimately sanctioned corporate capitalism in the name of war-
time victory and Cold War confrontation. Erie's reallocation of 
personal injury, insurance, and other civil litigation to state 
court-while at the same time altering the scope of interstate ac-
tions that could be litigated under federal diversity jurisdiction-
coincided with America's fervent postwar embrace of a con-
sumption-driven society.18 Although the decision's constitu-
tional significance was contested, Erie nonetheless also facili-
tated the federal judiciary's burgeoning federal question 
jurisdiction, which the Warren Court expanded in order to pro-
mote civil rights and liberties and to undercut McCarthyism. 
Both areas of federal jurisdiction engendered political de-
mands to curb judicial activism. In 1958 conservative Southern 
Democrats and Republicans supported a measure limiting fed-
17. Sec Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1908). On the relationship between Progressivism and New Deal Liberalism, see Alan 
Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Knopf, 1995); 
Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton U. Press, 
1974). 
18. See Brinkley, End of Reform at 66-85 (cited in note 17). 
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eral jurisdiction over cases involving individual rights; it failed to 
pass the Senate by just eight votes. In the same year, by con-
trast, legislation intended to reduce diversity suits did become 
law, but it was too weak to have a fundamentally transforming 
effect. Congressional inability to resolve persistent controversy 
arising from the Erie doctrine encouraged the Supreme Court to 
act. As a conservative Court majority gradually eroded most of 
the Warren Court precedents from the 1970s on, federal jurisdic-
tional authority favoring individual rights was cut back. 
Meanwhile, the evolving Erie doctrine occupied an impor-
tant place in American legal culture. It was central to some of 
the most important courses taught in the nation's law schools, 
including civil procedure and federal courts, which provided 
lawyers basic entry into the distinct federal and state judicial 
processes. Thus, generations of lawyers associated the Erie doc-
trine with the fundamental institutional avenues of dispute reso-
lution upon which client representation depended. Erie was also 
basic to the stark boundary between the markets served by trial 
and corporate defense lawyers. Purcell is especially good at re-
lating doctrinal change and political conflict to legal culture and 
the ideological construction of professional image. As the wider 
themes unfold he tells the fascinating story of how elite law 
teachers and judges-particularly Harvard law professor Henry 
M. Hart, Jr. and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter-
reimagined the figure and jurisprudence of Brandeis to legiti-
mate the application of the Erie precedent to the changing social 
and political realities of postwar America. 
Born respectively in 1856, 1882, and 1904, Brandeis, Frank-
furter, and Hart represented the successive generations identi-
fied with the rise and triumph of the Progressive constitution and 
its subsequent permutation into liberal constitutionalism. 19 
While the two younger men achieved their own professional 
prominence, both cultivated direct identification with Brandeis's 
personal ethos and professional mantle. Nevertheless, Frank-
furter and Hart, for different personal and principled reasons, 
initially disagreed with Erie, especially its constitutional dimen-
sion. Frankfurter in particular considered the decision's abstract 
19. Purcell notes that as Frankfurter and Hart grew older they were increasingly 
identified as conservatives, despite an earlier commitment to liberal and radical causes. 
Over the first half of the twentieth century, other prominent Progressives, including 
Learned Hand and Roscoe Pound, underwent the same transformation. Brandeis, how-
ever, adhered consistently to a fully developed Progressive creed throughout his adult 
life. This variation deserves further study. 
278 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 18:267 
constitutional imperative a threat to his own Progressive theo-
ries, which sought to minimize federal judicial activism, cloaking 
it under ideological cover of professional expertise and elitism. 
Over the decades following Brandeis's death in 1941, however, 
Frankfurter and Hart transformed the image of the legendary 
Justice to fit their own increasingly ambivalent interpretations of 
the Erie doctrine and liberal theories of federal jurisdiction. 
Purcell also makes an important contribution to labor and 
social history. On the level of technical procedure, which ordi-
narily would be primarily of interest to lawyers, he clarifies for 
historians why Brandeis opposed the Declaratory Judgments 
Act of 1934 and the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He 
knew they could be turned to the advantage of corporate liti-
gants and threatened basic values of local control. Many Pro-
gressives supported these measures because they furthered the 
cause of institutional systemization and rationalization; 
Brandeis, however, followed his own personal values and op-
posed them, attempting to address the dangers he perceived 
through the opaque language of the Erie opinion.20 (pp. 130-36) 
A more familiar confrontation involved the labor injunc-
tion. As noted above, a growing number of critical studies by 
O'Brien, Daniel Ernst, William Forbath, Victoria Hattam, Chris-
topher Tomlins, and others have argued that from the late nine-
teenth century to the New Deal, organized labor's standing 
within the nation's political economy was clearly contested. To a 
certain extent, however, the movement also succeeded in shap-
ing the outcome. Like other scholars, Purcell is sensitive to the 
ultimately limiting character of labor's triumph in ending the la-
bor injunction in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the sub-
sequent institution of regulatory dispute resolution in the New 
Deal's Wagner Act of 1935. Nevertheless, the resistance that la-
bor and its allies faced from business interests and their lawyers 
should not be underestimated. Purcell shows that, as Brandeis 
crafted the constitutional language of the Erie opinion, he in-
cluded a doctrinal hedge for the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which 
20. Purcell shows that prominent Progressive lawyers, such as Benjamin Cardozo 
and Charles E. Clark, desirous of achieving greater rationalization in the American legal 
system, favored these measures, whereas Brandeis did not. Purcell explains that Progres-
sives belonging to an older generation, like Brandeis, feared the political and social con-
sequences resulting from organizational centralization, whereas their younger counter-
parts valued efficiency more highly. Although Purcell makes a convincing case for 
Brandeis's decentralist values as being representative of the older Progressive genera-
tion, I think a similarly strong case can be made for an argument that the Justice's moti-
vations were more distinctively personal. See note 14 and discussion below. 
2001] BOOK REVIEWS 279 
was then also under review by the Supreme Court. Similarly, 
Brandeis fashioned the Erie decision to eliminate the advantages 
corporate defendants gained from exploiting federal diversity ju-
risdiction and the federal common law built up around the Swift 
doctrine. Although unintended or contradictory consequences 
often resulted, fundamentally, legal processes and doctrines pos-
sessed a protean legitimacy adaptable to changing social condi-
tions and interests. 
Ill 
The ironic play of volition and contingency is especially evi-
dent in Purcell's analysis of Erie. Six members of the Court 
voted to overturn the Swift doctrine; but despite reservations ex-
pressed by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Harlan F. Stone 
and Stanley Reed, Brandeis insisted that his opinion should es-
tablish constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction. 
Over much of the century following its creation in 1842, federal 
judges continuously exercised the discretion inherent in Swift to 
broaden the scope of the federal common law, until it included 
industrial torts, like the injury which befell the unemployed la-
borer, Harry Tompkins, in the Erie case. Corporations, of 
course, routinely exploited the Swift doctrine in such suits; nev-
ertheless, plaintiffs' lawyers often succeeded in turning it to the 
benefit of their clients in personal injury and wrongful death 
cases because the tort doctrines of the states were often in con-
flict and federal judges would employ their discretionary author-
ity to apply a rule favoring the plaintiff. 
The broad constitutional connections Brandeis perceived 
between the Swift doctrine, Congress, the federal judiciary, and 
state authority made him less concerned about the status of per-
sonal injury plaintiffs if Swift were overruled. Thus the immedi-
ate loser in Erie was Tompkins. He had won a $30,000 jury ver-
dict because the federal trial judge had followed the Swift 
doctrine and applied the more liberal negligence rule of the 
American law restatement. On the basis of the new doctrine 
Brandeis established in overturning Swift, however, the trial 
judge was now bound to apply the Pennsylvania law where the 
accident occurred, which designated individuals in Tompkins's 
position as trespassers. Thus, Tompkins was denied damage 
claims against the railroad. 
Justice Hugo L. Black unsuccessfully attempted to preserve 
Tompkins's verdict, but otherwise he vigorously supported 
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Brandeis' opinion. Purcell concedes that Black's ambivalent 
stance favoring both the plaintiff's recovery and Brandeis's opin-
ion denying that result was due to the Alabamian's unswerving 
commitment to maintaining the vigor of jury trials. Indeed, in 
the years to come, Black was the Court's great champion of trial 
lawyers. Purcell nonetheless notes only in passing that both the 
federal trial and appellate court applied the discretionary judg-
ment inherent in the Swift doctrine to decide in Tompkins's fa-
vor. Furthermore, each of the judges involved in these holdings 
may be said to have been broadly associated with Progressive 
values.21 
The mixed motivations shaping the Erie opinion reflected 
the divergent values and interests inherent in Progressive consti-
tutionalism's ascendancy over Brewer's faith in judicial primacy. 
Brandeis approached the opinion with an absolute conviction 
that Brewer's constitutional ideals could be addressed ade-
quately only through an equally comprehensive but contrary 
constitutional theory. Hughes and Stone were nonetheless ap-
prehensive about the scope of the theory Brandeis suggested in 
initial drafts of the opinion; whereupon he responded with in-
creasingly vague language until it was acceptable to his two col-
leagues. The issue was difficult, however, because it touched the 
diverse Progressive backgrounds of the majority deciding Erie. 
The eight members of the Court participating in the opinion 
were Hughes, Brandeis, Black, Reed, Stone, Owen J. Roberts, 
James J. McReynolds, and Pierce Butler. In ill health which 
ended in death some months after the Court handed down Erie 
in 1938, the Progressive jurist Benjamin Cardozo took no part in 
the decision, though he had supported the initial appeal from the 
circuit court to the Supreme Court.22 The Court's remaining ad-
herents to Brewer's vision and New Deal opponents, 
McReynolds and Butler, dissented. 
Of the four Court members who joined Brandeis's Erie 
opinion, Hughes, Stone, and Roberts, were prominent Progres-
sive Republicans. Black also signed on to the opinion. During 
the mid-1920s he briefly had been a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan, but he had also actively supported leading Progressive 
causes in his native Alabama and in the U.S. Senate before be-
21. The federal trial court judge was Samuel Mandelbaum; Learned Hand, Augus-
tus Hand, and Thomas Swan rendered the unanimous circuit court of appeals decision. 
For their association with Progressivism see Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance, at 125-29, 
142-43 (cited in note 9). 
22. Id. at 129-30. 
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coming one of Roosevelt's most loyal New Deal liberals. Reed 
voted with the majority to end the Swift doctrine, but his concur-
ring opinion objected to Brandeis's constitutional language, ar-
guing that a limited construction of section 34 would be suffi-
cient to achieve the desired result without raising new 
uncertainty about the scope of federal jurisdiction amid the great 
transformation initiated by the Court's affirmation of the New 
Deal.23 (pp. 104, 107-09) Republican President Herbert Hoover, 
who was also a forgotten Progressive, had appointed Reed, a 
moderate Kentucky Democrat, as counsel for the Federal Farm 
Bureau and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to fight 
the Depression. After the 1932 election Reed became Roose-
velt's Solicitor General; fresh from defending the New Deal be-
fore the shifting Court, Erie was the first case he participated in 
as a Justice.24 
Purcell makes it clear that the divisions among the Progres-
sive majority concerned Brandeis's reliance upon a constitu-
tional theory to overturn Swift. Still, I think he could have done 
more to distinguish Brandeis's values from those shared by the 
southern Democrats Black and Reed. In the field of First 
Amendment freedom of speech David M. Rabban is suggestive 
regarding the distinction between the libertarian radical tradi-
tion-to which Black could be said to be sympathetic-and the 
Brandeisian conviction that free speech was the precondition for 
democratic citizenship. Similarly, I would suggest that in Erie, 
Black's small-town southern background led him to trust in the 
ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to tap the communal spontaneity of 
jury trials and local court culture. Brandeis, however, viewed 
trial and appellate court process more as the means to promote 
individual responsibility and democratic citizenship.25 
While the motivations behind Reed's concurring opinion in 
Erie are obscure, it is reasonable to speculate that at least two 
factors influenced him. First, Reed shared with Black a small-
town southern background, so he, like Black, may have been 
more willing to give Tompkins a fighting chance in a new jury 
trial. Second, and more important, Reed perhaps perceived in 
the constitutional language of Brandeis's opinion unnecessary 
23. Id. at 135-36, 161-62. 
24. See Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 135 (cited in note 9). On Hoover's Pro-
gressivism see Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-1933,74 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1067 (1989). 
25. Sec Rabban, Free Speech (cited in note 7); Tony Freyer, Hugo L. Black and the 
Dilemma of American Liberalism (Addison-Wesley, 1990). 
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procedural complexities that could arise in connection with the 
new constitutional presumption the Court was giving the New 
Deal regulatory bureaucracy after 1937. After all, as Solicitor 
General he had witnessed first hand the Court's shift from op-
posing to supporting the New Deal. Thus, rather ironically, 
Reed, not Brandeis, was the one making the Progressive argu-
ment for judicial self-restraint.26 
The tensions among the Progressive justices deciding Erie 
suggested its ambiguous impact on postwar American society. 
For practicing lawyers from 1938 on, the practical result of Erie's 
overturning of the Swift doctrine was that federal judges now 
had to apply state common law in federal diversity cases. Ac-
cordingly, a retired Little Rock attorney reminisced in 1979 that 
the day the Court announced Erie was the "worst of his life," be-
cause he lost the advantage he had had representing interstate 
insurance corporations in federal court. No longer could he es-
cape local Arkansas juries by removing his client's case before 
federal judges who applied corporation-friendly rules under the 
Swift doctrine.27 Purcell's earlier massive study of diversity ju-
risdiction from 1870 to 1958 confirms that the Arkansas lawyer's 
experience was typical of corporate defense counsel prior to the 
Erie decision. Purcell's new book notes that by the 1980s, how-
ever, the state law that federal judges were required to apply was 
becoming increasingly more conservative as many states enacted 
pro-business tort reform. 
Ambivalent outcomes resulted especially from Erie's consti-
tutional holding. Legal practitioners, law teachers, and jurists 
noted repeatedly that Butler and McReynolds based their dis-
sent primarily on the venerable rule that a court should not ad-
dress an issue, especially a constitutional one, unless it has been 
properly litigated by the parties. In Erie, counsel for neither side 
had questioned the constitutional underpinnings of the Swift 
doctrine. Thus, the dissenters argued, the decision's use of a 
constitutional rationale to overturn the long standing Swift doc-
trine violated established tenets of judicial self-restraint that 
Brandeis and other Progressives had defended for many years. 
Erie was consistent with Progressive constitutional values, which 
favored restraining federal judicial power within the coextensive 
26. Reed followed the logic of Brandeis's classic statement of judicial self-restraint 
in Ash wander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
27. Tony A Freyer Interview A .F. House, Little Rock, Arkansas, June 16, 1980. 
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bounds of Congress; but it was a restraint achieved through pro-
nounced judicial activism. 
Erie's constitutional ambiguity nonetheless sanctioned an 
expansive federal jurisdiction facilitating post-war American so-
ciety's transformation. During the second half of the twentieth 
century Americans increasingly identified the federal judiciary 
and the Supreme Court as the nation's primary defender of civil 
rights and liberties, establishing a historic degree of racial and 
gender equality under the Constitution. Purcell expertly exam-
ines the role of Harvard law professor Henry Hart and other 
elite legal professionals in promoting interpretations of Erie's 
constitutional language, which widened federal court jurisdiction 
to match the expanding reach of the postwar liberal state. 
Working through the channels of extended federal judicial and 
administrative power, the civil rights movement, women's rights 
advocates, and numerous public interest groups achieved signifi-
cant social reforms during the postwar decades. Over the same 
period, by contrast, issues involving diversity jurisdiction, which 
had been so important earlier in the century, had become suffi-
ciently routine that they were peripheral to ongoing disputes 
about the federal judiciary's authority. 
Purcell's chapter on Hart splendidly interweaves these 
themes to suggest how Erie's Progressive constitutionalism was 
transformed into the liberal constitutionalism identified with the 
Warren Court. Hart had been one of Brandeis's law clerks, but 
like his mentor, Frankfurter, he initially had profound misgivings 
concerning the constitutional dimension the Justice had intro-
duced into the Erie decision. By the 1950s, however, Hart had 
reformulated the Erie doctrine in order to construct a brilliant 
jurisprudential foundation for "neutral principles" supporting 
federal judicial supremacy within American federalism. 28 (p. 
229-57) Meanwhile, he blunted the intellectual force of Frank-
furter's efforts to curtail the expansion of the Erie doctrine's 
constitutional language. Ironically, although Hart favored the 
greater social justice the Warren Court achieved through judicial 
supremacy, he was an adamant foe of the doctrinal theories the 
Court employed to reach its results. Hart believed that the 
Court was violating the delicate balance of neutral principles he 
had fashioned to both check and promote the liberal state. 
28. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 2 (1959), for Hart's jurisprudential contribution to the idea of "neutral 
principles." 
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From the 1970s on, within American politics and profes-
sional legal culture, opposition mounted to judicial activism. In 
the book's concluding chapter Purcell provides historical per-
spective on the relevance of Erie as a reference point for the dy-
namics of social and legal change in turn-of-the-century Amer-
ica. In the market for legal services-including what law schools 
teach in order to prepare students to enter the legal profession-
Erie perpetuated a constitutionally sanctioned jurisdiction for 
state law which significantly influenced lawyers' practice and the 
relation between federal and state courts. It thus maintained 
and facilitated the adaptation of the American Constitution's 
decentralist values during a new era of national bureaucratic and 
corporate centralization and globalization. In this connection 
the Progressives' opposition to federal diversity jurisdiction, 
which motivated Brandeis and other reformers in response to 
the evils of industrialization, has little continuing institutional or 
ideological force. Despite considerable contemporary criticism 
that diversity suits are organizationally inefficient, the rule of 
Erie nonetheless has established a balance of interests between 
plaintiff and corporate defense lawyers. Especially in interstate 
personal injury and insurance claims, lawyers on both sides have 
employed diversity jurisdiction as a routine source of dispute 
resolution in the new age. 
Meanwhile, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's conserva-
tive Court majority, its repeated rhetorical condemnation of ju-
dicial activism to the contrary notwithstanding, construed the 
Erie precedent in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.(1988) to 
establish a "federal common law defense to state tort claims that 
allowed government contractors to avoid suits brought by indi-
viduals injured by defective products."29 (p. 301) Much like the 
Supreme Court's more familiar decisions concerning abortion 
rights, the Boyle decision suggests that the Erie of the new age of 
conservatism merely employs old style judicial activism to the 
benefit of new litigants. 
IV 
Purcell's prodigious research supports a persuasively argued 
thesis, which raises some interesting questions. Like Alfred 
Chandler, who displaced the "good guys-bad guys" view of busi-
ness history with the thesis of managerial capitalism, Purcell de-
29. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
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contextualizes constitutional institutions and law, making them a 
primary process of conflict resolution in American society. He 
clearly presents Brandeis and his famous opinion as reflections 
of the Progressive vision and the institutionalization of political, 
economic and cultural struggle. At book's end Purcell concedes 
that the Brandeisian Progressive vision has lost its practical force 
in a new age of conservatism. He suggests, however, that 
Brandeisian values, refracted through professional legal culture 
and constitutional discourse, retain power to inspire America at 
the millennium. While Purcell is undoubtedly correct about 
Brandeis's leading influence within Progressivism, a legitimate 
question arises concerning the representativeness of Brandeisian 
values as distinct from his role as an effective advocate. 
Brandeis's faith in small units and local control stemmed 
from an absolute certainty that giant corporations threatened the 
personal independence and accountability upon which participa-
tory democratic citizenship depended. He adamantly opposed 
the consumption-driven economic order, advertising, and con-
sumerism generally, because they pandered to human weakness, 
which invited political corruption and social immorality. These 
convictions were so strong that Brandeis actively, though ulti-
mately unsuccessfully, supported the legal right of smali busi-
nessmen to engage in price fixing as a way to attain the same 
benefits of economies of scale that big corporations gained 
through mergers and managerial centralization.30 He also pro-
foundly distrusted the investment methods Wall Street lawyers 
pioneered to establish corporate giants. "I feel very sure that ... 
[people like us) ought not to buy and sell stocks," he wrote to his 
brother. "Prices of stock[s) are made. They don't grow; and 
their fluctuations are not due to natural causes."31 Most Pro-
gressives probably did not embrace these v~lues; yet Brandeis 
adapted them to ongoing reform efforts, joining others within 
the diverse Progressive movement to achieve goals he and they 
shared. 
Brandeis's ability to adjust his most deeply held convictions 
to wider Progressive goals shaped the ambiguous constitutional 
holding in the Erie opinion. Ever since 1938, the decision's link 
between this constitutional language and the widely accepted 
need to overturn the Swift doctrine has remained controversial. 
Purcell's comprehensive evidence demonstrates that Brandeis 
30. See McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, 101-08 (cited in note 14). 
31. Allan Gal, Brandeis of Boston 25-26 (Harvard U. Press, 1980). 
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was primarily responsible for the constitutional thrust of the Erie 
opinion, but more could have been done to show that within 
Progressivism Brandeis possessed distinctive constitutional and 
legal values. Thus during the 1912 Presidential election, Democ-
rat Woodrow Wilson, though campaigning with Brandeisian 
rhetoric against Theodore Roosevelt and Howard Taft, never 
accepted Brandeis's absolute condemnation of constitutional 
due process theories which fostered the power of giant corpora-
tions. Moreover, during the 1920s Justice Brandeis supported 
trade associations because they enabled many comparatively 
small firms to survive; the two Progressive Republicans Stone 
and Hoover also promoted the trade association movement, but, 
according to Hawley, in order to "reconcile cooperative stabili-
zation and developmental mechanisms with antitrust objec-
tives."32 Initially, the Supreme Court-over Brandeis's dissent-
opposed trade association practices, but the 1925 Maple Flooring 
Association decision upheld Stone's argument that many such 
practices were legal. The Court's decision not only confirmed a 
broad Progressive policy objective, but also represented the ac-
commodation of diverse motivational strands within Progressiv-
ism.33 
Purcell shows that a similar process of accommodation oc-
curred among the majority deciding Erie. The opinion's basic 
logic and substance was clearly Brandeis's. Just as the Justice's 
underlying motivation differed from other leading Progressives 
in the trade association fight, so his distinctive social values and 
jurisprudence compelled a constitutional remedy for the abuses 
identified with the Swift doctrine. Hughes and Stone nonetheless 
succeeded in diluting Brandeis's initially stronger constitutional 
rationale, while Reed opposed it more forcefully. Given such 
strong internal tensions shaping the crafting of the Erie opinion, 
the resulting ambiguous constitutional language was under-
standable. 
The ascendancy of the Progressive constitutional regime, its 
influence upon the liberal Warren Court era that followed, and 
the subsequent conservative backlash both reflected and sus-
tained the course of social conflict in twentieth-century America. 
Purcell's presentation of Progressive legal culture as the coun-
32. Hawley, 74 Iowa L. Rev. at 1102 (cited in note 24). 
33. For views Hoover, Stone, and Brandeis shared on trade associations see Tony 
Freyer, Regulating Big Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880-1990 218-19 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1992). Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 
(1925). 
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terpoint to Brewer's pro-corporate constitutionalism demon-
strates that state and federal judiciaries and the U. S. Supreme 
Court were dynamic channels of social struggle in which corpo-
rate-capitalist and reform interests clashed for control. This re-
placement of a static image of judicial dispute resolution with a 
dynamic one makes a major contribution to contemporary 
American historiography. It also gives legal practitioners a 
deeper awareness of the extent to which even the most technical 
procedural doctrines upon which their professional autonomy 
depend are imbedded in changing social, political, and cultural 
contexts. Purcell's exposition of the Brandeisian Progressive 
constitution confirms that the interdependence between judicial 
and democratic power in America rarely produces an equitable 
allocation of opportunity; but, usually, it has been wide enough 
to diffuse broadbased, ongoing social disorder. 
A question, nonetheless, remains regarding the origins of 
the constitutional theory Brandeis wrote into Erie. The Swift 
doctrine's initial meaning had been transformed by the time Jus-
tice Brewer adopted it to the goal of establishing judicial pri-
macy. It is fair to say that Purcell neglects the degree to which 
for two decades following the Civil War this steady expansion of 
the Swift doctrine was vigorously contested in Congress, among 
practicing lawyers and law teachers at such places as Harvard 
Law School and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and 
within the federal judiciary, including an unstable majority on 
the Supreme Court. The confrontation involved, moreover, not 
the doctrine as originally formulated by a unanimous Court in 
1842 in accordance with the principles of dual sovereignty, but 
what a new Court majority had done to steadily reshape it. Be-
ginning in Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1863), the Court erected a con-
stitutional defense of numerous foreign creditors in the bond 
cases. By the 1890s it also incorporated into the federal common 
law a broadened negligence principle in railroad accident litiga-
tion.34 Even so, before the Civil War an uncontroversial Swift 
doctrine embraced a narrowly conceived commercial jurispru-
dence; its postwar counterpart, however, facilitated the rise of 
the pro-corporate due process constitutionalism associated with 
Brewer and Lochner. 35 
34. See note 9 and 11. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1863). 
35. Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner - Diversity Jurisdiction and the Develop-
ment of General Constitutional Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 1263 (2000). 
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The distinction between the original and remade Swift had a 
direct bearing on the controversial constitutional rationale 
Brandeis incorporated into Erie. In the Justice's private files of 
the Erie opinion are his handwritten notes referring to works 
published during the postwar decades by the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School's Judge John Innis Clark Hare and Harvard 
Law School's James Bradley Thayer. These sources do not ap-
pear in the published decision's copious citations, but they 
clearly influenced Brandeis's thinking as he drafted the opinion. 
Hare, Thayer and others opposed the new "constitutionalized" 
Swift emerging after Gelpcke, not the Taney Court's initial doc-
trine. Brandeis drew upon these older critical works, undoubt-
edly because they reinforced his own personal values regarding 
the need to realign federal judicial and legislative power as a 
matter of constitutional interpretation.36 Would Brandeis's Erie 
opinion have been less tendentious if it had addressed the origi-
nal Swift doctrine Taney, Story, and their states' rights col-
leagues had found so congenial? 
CONCLUSION 
Generations of lawyers and judges have grappled with the 
procedural and constitutional imperatives of adapting the Con-
stitution's system of federalism to America's place in a changing 
global order. The technical dimensions of the relationship be-
tween Swift and Erie have less relevance to historians than the 
practical bearing the cases have had on maintaining the judici-
ary's and the legal profession's powerful influence in American 
society. Purcell's sweeping and original interpretation of 
Brandeis and the Progressive constitution not only makes a sig-
nificant contribution to the fields of law and history separately, 
but combines insights from each to provide a deeper understand-
ing of twentieth-century America. His conceptualization of fed-
eral jurisdiction as a central institution of dispute resolution in 
the nation's social process establishes a new way of thinking 
about the dominance of corporate capitalism and the rise and 
erosion of the liberal regulatory state. The question of the origi-
nal Swift doctrine's lost meaning suggests, as Tocqueville inti-
mated, that the federal judiciary's primary role in preserving so-
cial order reached back to the nation's earliest days. Purcell's 
focus on the development of this role since the end of nineteenth 
36. Freyer, Harmony & Dissonance at 142-53 (cited in note 9). 
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century affirms the value of locating the constitutional channels 
which contain social struggle within the long time stream of 
American history. Approached in this light, Purcell reveals the 
soul of American constitutional governance. 
